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Abstract
The Time To the Most Recent Common Ancestor (TMRCA) based on human mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) is esti-
mated to be twice that based on the non-recombining part of the Y chromosome (NRY). These TMRCAs have special
demographic implications because mtDNA is transmitted only from mother to child, while NRY is passed along from
father to son. Therefore, the former locus reflects female history, and the latter, male history. To investigate what
caused the two-to-one female-male TMRCA ratio rF/M = TF/TM in humans, we develop a forward-looking agent-
based model (ABM) with overlapping generations. Our ABM simulates agents with individual life cycles, including
life events such as reaching maturity or menopause. We implemented two main mating systems: polygynandry and
polygyny with different degrees in between. In each mating system, the male population can be either homogeneous
or heterogeneous. In the latter case, some males are ‘alphas’ and others are ‘betas’, which reflects the extent to which
they are favored by female mates. A heterogeneous male population implies a competition among males with the
purpose of signaling as alpha males. The introduction of a heterogeneous male population is found to reduce by a
factor 2 the probability of finding equal female and male TMRCAs and shifts the distribution of rF/M to higher values.
In order to account for the empirical observation of the factor 2, a high level of heterogeneity in the male population
is needed: less than half the males can be alphas and betas can have at most half the fitness of alphas for the TMRCA
ratio to depart significantly from 1. In addition, we find that, in the modes that maximize the probability of having
1.5 < rF/M < 2.5, the present generation has 1.4 times as many female as male ancestors. We also tested the effect of
sex-biased migration and sex-specific death rates and found that these are unlikely to explain alone the sex-biased TM-
RCA ratio observed in humans. Our results support the view that we are descended from males who were successful
in a highly competitive context, while females were facing a much smaller female-female competition.
Keywords: humans, male-male competition, agent-based model, mtDNA, NRY
1. Introduction
All humans alive today share common ancestors,
which can be dated along specific ancestry lines using
DNA samples. Human mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA)
and the non-recombining part of the Y chromosome
(NRY) have received particularly great attention in the
context of modern human origin. While mtDNA is
transmitted exclusively from mother to child (female or
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male), NRY is passed along only from father to son. Un-
expectedly, genetic studies have shown that the Time to
the Most Recent Common Ancestor (TMRCA) along
all-females ancestry lines (female TMRCA or TF) is
about twice that along all-males lines (male TMRCA
or TM): 170-240 thousand years for the female TM-
RCA (Tang et al., 2002; Ingman et al., 2000; Cann et al.,
1987), compared with 46-110 thousand years for the
male TMRCA (Tang et al., 2002; Pritchard et al., 1999;
Thomson et al., 2000; Hammer and Zegura, 2002).
The finding of the ratio rF/M = TF/TM ' 2 is impor-
tant for several reasons. A first interest lies in the in-
terpretation of the concept of effective population size.
Geneticists use the Wright-Fisher model to establish a
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correspondence between the genetic diversity of a popu-
lation, its effective population size and its TMRCA. The
Wright-Fisher model assumes a haploid population (i.e.
all-female or all-male), random mating, a Poisson distri-
bution of reproductive success, non overlapping genera-
tions and a constant population size. The Wright-Fisher
population size that would have yielded the same ge-
netic diversity in the model as in the reality is defined as
the effective population size. In this model, the effective
population is proportional to the TMRCA. A two-to-one
TMRCA ratio thus means a two-to-one effective popu-
lation size. However, the concept of effective population
size is merely a mathematical tool and does not corre-
spond to a ‘real’ population size (e.g. census or breeding
size). Approximations have been developed that give a
connection between effective population size and breed-
ing size (Hedrick, 2000). A better understanding of the
origin of the ratio rF/M ' 2 would provide insights into
the correspondence between female and male breeding
populations (and underlying social structure) and TM-
RCA ratio. As we explain below, one contribution of
the ABM that we develop below is to give a concrete
realization of the correspondence between female and
male breeding populations and TMRCA ratio through a
representation as realistic as possible of a population in
which both sexes interact with each other.
The finding of the ratio rF/M ' 2 has also been seen
as having important implications in relation to the differ-
ence in risk-taking behavior between genders. Baumeis-
ter (2010) implicitly considered as equal the effective
population size and the number of our ancestors. He
made the general assumption that the two-to-one TM-
RCA ratio means that we have twice as many female
as male ancestors. This interpretation implies impor-
tant sex-biased behaviors, in particular in the area of risk
taking. Baumeister argues that these biases help explain
many puzzling facts about male social behavior, includ-
ing competitive behaviors and excessive risk taking in
modern financial markets. Another contribution of our
ABM is to test Baumeister’s interpretation concerning
the number of our female and male ancestors.
Two classes of explanations have been proposed to
explain the sex-biased genetic patterns that indicate un-
equal TMRCAs. One class of explanations is based on
effective polygyny, ‘whereby males tend to father chil-
dren with more females than females do with males’
(Wilder et al., 2004b). The other class is based on fe-
male sex-biased dispersal (Seielstad et al., 1998).
For the first class, the most important consequence of
effective polygyny is that males exhibit a higher vari-
ance in reproductive success than females. Indeed, as
soon as some males monopolize several females each,
others leave no descendants, while the distribution of re-
productive success among females remains fairly egal-
itarian. Coalescent theory, which belongs to popula-
tion genetics, established the theoretical material used
to infer TMRCAs based on DNA samples (see Hedrick
(2000) for an introduction to coalescent theory as a part
of population genetics). In coalescent theory, a larger
male than female variance in reproductive success is
expected to result in a smaller male than female TM-
RCA. Qualitatively, this is because some males have
many more children than others, which makes the suc-
cessful ones likely to become common ancestors. On
the other hand, if all females have about the same num-
ber of children, it takes more time for a female to
become a common ancestor (through what we could
call ‘pedigree drift’ in our model, by analogy with ge-
netic drift). The two main population genetics mod-
els applied in the context of coalescent theiry are the
Wright-Fisher model (Wright, 1931; Fisher, 1930) and
the Moran model (Moran, 1958, 1962). Each model as-
sumes that individuals mate at random and predicts the
TMRCA based on this plus other inputs (for a review of
these two models, see Wakeley (2009)).
The second class of explanations is female sex-biased
geographic dispersal, whereby females disperse over
larger spatial distances than males. This mechanism
is often discussed as a possible explanation for ob-
served patterns of genetic diversity in close non-human
primates (Eriksson et al., 2006) and in humans, some
(Seielstad et al., 1998) arguing in favor of female dis-
persal, others (Wilder et al., 2004b,a) dismissing it; see
Wilkins and Marlowe (2006) for a review. Migration of
individuals results in a so-called gene flow, and coales-
cent theory including gene flow is called the ‘structured
coalescent’ (Wakeley, 2009; Hedrick, 2000). When fe-
males disperse, local mtDNA pools might include genes
coming from a larger region, locally increasing genetic
diversity. At the same time, if males do not migrate or
migrate much less than females, NRY variation within
populations should be quite small. Local DNA analyses
then infer a higher female than male effective population
size as more genetically different females than males
contributed to each region, and thus deduce a higher fe-
male than male TMRCA.
In the present paper, we follow a different reasoning
and investigate how the mating structure influences the
resulting TMRCA, using an agent-based model (ABM,
or individual-based model, as it is often called in biol-
ogy). Our agent-based model allows us to investigate
which of several possible social organizations (includ-
ing several mating systems and sex-biased migration)
is/are most likely to result in larger female vs. male
2
TMRCA. Our results focus on the TMRCA ratio rF/M =
TF/TM , which is about 2 according to genetic studies,
as reviewed above. Our ABM is forward-looking in
time and simulates a population with overlapping gener-
ations of agents. Our agents have life cycle events such
as reaching sexual maturity or menopause. Our model
includes no genetic evolution of individual traits. Af-
ter each simulation lasting hundreds of generations, TF
and TM are exactly retrieved by exploring the genealog-
ical tree of the present male population backward in
time, as if analyzing their mtDNA and NRY. We do not
assume distributions of reproductive success from the
start. Instead, we control the mating pattern at the social
level and observe the resulting distributions of repro-
ductive success for each gender. This is allowed by the
unique features of our ABM, namely forward-looking
and overlapping generations. This contrasts with co-
alescent models, which are backward-looking and as-
sume non-overlapping generations. Existing forwards-
in-time models almost always assume non-overlapping
generations and thus have to input distributions of repro-
ductive success. To our knowledge, the only program
that implements overlapping generations is BottleSim
and it has been applied exclusively to the problem of
bottlenecks (Kuo and Janzen, 2003).
The different social organizations implemented in our
ABM are polygynandry (or promiscuity) and polygyny
(in the traditional sense, i.e., as a social contract and
with some generalizations). Each mode comes with at
least two variants, whereby the male population is re-
spectively homogeneous or heterogeneous. In the lat-
ter case, some males are ‘alphas’ and others are ‘betas’,
which can be understood as reflecting how easily they
can mate based on female preferences. Input parame-
ters are the proportion of alphas and how much more
successful alphas are as compared to betas in attracting
mates. A heterogeneous male population implies a com-
petition among males as each of them strives to appear
as an alpha. Effective polygyny (which by definition
does not necessarily imply the existence of marriage in
the form of a social contract) is or is not realized in our
model, depending on the mode, variant and some agent
life cycle characteristics. An additional variant in the
polygyny mode allows to create a condition very close
to lifelong monogamy. Furthermore, sex-biased migra-
tion can take place within any of these mating systems.
We implement this possibility by considering an island
model of two subpopulations (or demes) exchanging
agents.
The exploration of the parameter space of our ABM
shows that a TMRCA ratio rF/M of 2 is realized with a
significantly higher likelihood within a heterogeneous
male population (consisting of alpha and beta males)
than within a homogeneous male population, indepen-
dently of the mating system (polygynandry or polyg-
yny). Indeed, while about 60% of the simulations have
0.5 < rF/M < 1.5 in the homogeneous mode, a hetero-
geneous male population lowers by half this percentage
and shifts the distribution of the TMRCA ratio to higher
values. Moreover, the heterogeneity level needs to be
high: less than half of the males can be alphas, while
betas can have no more than half the fitness of alphas
for the TMRCA ratio to depart from 1. Our simulations
suggest that sex-biased migration alone is very unlikely
to contribute to the observed TMRCA ratio. We also
discuss the possibility that unequal sex-specific death
rates may have played an important role, but argue that
it could hardly have taken place with the required in-
tensity without the existence of significant male-male
competition.
The investigation of the genealogical tree produced
by our ABM also shows that, in the modes that maxi-
mize the probability of the TMRCA ratio to lie between
1.5 and 2.5, the present generation has approximately
1.4 times as many female as male ancestors. An an-
cestor is defined as an agent who has at least one de-
scendant among the present generation, along any lin-
eage. Counting the ancestors belonging to each gender
provides a measure of the transmission success of fe-
males and males, in a genealogical and potentially ge-
netic sense. Our results support the interpretation of the
observed TMRCA ratio made by Baumeister (2010) and
the sex-specific behavioral consequences thereof.
In summary, our results indicate that we are de-
scended from males who succeeded in a highly compet-
itive context and from females who did not have to face
the same competitive conditions. We put these findings
in the perspective of recent psychological and sociolog-
ical studies concerning gender differences with respect
to preference for competition, overconfidence and risk
decisions. In particular, we link our results to sociolog-
ical aspects of financial bubbles and crashes originating
on trading floors that appear to be fertile grounds for un-
leashed male-male competition in the almost complete
absence of females.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
We present our agent-based model in Section 2. De-
tailed results are discussed in Section 3. Our main re-
sults are summarized in Section 4 and we discuss their
implications in Section 5.
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Figure 1: Typical life cycle of a female (proportions are not respected). Males only have the events Birth, Maturity and Natural Death and participate
to the mating interactions at every time step between Maturity and their death. When the carrying capacity is exceeded, any agent might die at any
time between her birth and the age of natural death.
2. Agent-based model
2.1. General set-up
Our agents have the following life cycles, as illus-
trated by Figure 1.
Mating interactions take place at every time step.
Only mature males and mature premenopausal females
participate. The different mating systems we imple-
mented are described in section 2.3.
Pregnancies and births (incl. lactation): Pregnancy
lasts G time steps. Pregnant females have the same
probability of dying as any other agent. If this happens,
the unborn baby is not counted as an agent in the simu-
lation. Newborns have a 50% chance of being of either
sex. A mother remains infertile after giving birth during
a lactation time L.
Maturity and menopause: When agents become
sexually mature, they start participating in the mat-
ing interactions. Females stop when they undergo
menopause.
Deaths: We give as inputs two carrying capacities
KF and KM , resp. for females and males. At each time
step, we ensure that the population size of either sex is at
most equal to the respective carrying capacity. The pop-
ulation thus remains constant with KF + KM members in
total. Agents that reach the maximum age die of natu-
ral death, independently of the population size. Specif-
ically, if NF is the number of females (resp. males),
the probability that a female survives, if she is younger
than the maximum age, is equal to 1 if NF ≤ KF and to
KF/NF otherwise.
Parameters: Considering that one time step rep-
resents one calendar day, we choose G = 270 (≈ 9
months) and L = 1200 (≈ 3.5 years, which are typical
of forager societies, e.g. see Konner (1978)). Agents
become sexually mature at 5’400 (≈ 15 years old), fe-
males reach menopause at 18’000 (≈ 50 years old) and
natural death occurs at 25’000 (≈ 70 years old). We
checked that our results are not influenced by varying
these parameters across realistic ranges, by having sex-
specific ages of maturity or by letting menopausal fe-
males participate in the mating interactions (see section
3.5). We also discuss sex-specific carrying capacities
(KF , KM) in section 3.4. For most of our simulations,
we set KF = KM = 75, corresponding in total to Dun-
bar’s prediction for the typical size of social groups as-
sociated with the human cognitive power to manage so-
cial relationships (Dunbar, 1993). As long as KF = KM ,
the population size does not influence the results shown
in Tables 2 and 3 (we tested several population sizes
up to KF = KM = 500). No change of our results are
found when reducing all duration-related parameters by
a proportional factor, i.e. by setting that one time step
represents for instance one week (then G = 38, L = 170,
etc.) or one month (G = 9, L = 40, etc.). Thus, within a
broad range, the granularity of time steps has no influ-
ence on our results.
We simulated hundreds of synthetic worlds for each
set of population characteristics. For each simulation,
we used the last generation of males as our sample and
searched the genealogical tree for their female and male
MRCA. As generations are overlapping, the generation
length has to be externally defined in order to select
our sample. This definition influences only our sam-
ple choice. We usually choose the generation length lgen
equal to the maturity age and posit that agents born be-
tween iteration nlgen and (n+1)lgen belong to generation
n + 1 (n ∈ N).
The number of time steps per simulation was cho-
sen such that a female and a male common ancestors
could always be found for the sample. With the above
parameters, this corresponds to approximately 2 million
time steps. Then, for each gender, the TMRCA was
computed as the last time step minus the MRCA’s date
of birth. We observed that increasing the number of
time steps does not increase TMRCAs but only shifts
the MRCAs forward in time, as it should.
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In summary, our parameters are as follows:
1 time step ' 1 day;
G = 270; L = 1200; Menopause = 18000;
Maximum Age = 25000;
KF = 75; KM = 75; Iterations = 2 × 106 (1)
2.2. Male population characteristics
Each newborn male is assigned a fitness f ∈ [0, 1].
It can represent his technical skills (such as hunting or
buiding a shelter), social status, attractiveness, physical
strength/endurance, sociability, health, intelligence, re-
sources or many other traits. Depending on the mating
mode, this fitness acts as the probability that fertile fe-
males met by a male get pregnant from him, or as the
probability that females choose a male to be their hus-
band.
Alpha males have a fitness fα = 1 and beta males
have a fitness fβ with 0 < fβ < 1 (all beta males have
the same fitness). Newborn males have a probability pα
of being alphas and 1− pα of being betas, independently
of their father’s fitness.
If pα = 1 or pα = 0, the male population is homo-
geneous (all-alphas or all-betas). Otherwise, we refer to
this situation as a heterogeneous mode characterized by
pα and fβ.
2.3. Mating interactions and sex-biased migration
We tested our model with two different mating sys-
tems, polygynandry and polygyny, as well as under a
condition of sex-biased migration.
2.3.1. Polygynandry
At each time step, each mature male chooses a fer-
tile female at random and tries to mate. This results in
a pregnancy with a probability equal to the male’s fit-
ness. The order in which males are considered to pick
a female is randomized at each time step. It is thus as
if males were choosing females at the same time dur-
ing each time step and sometimes competiting over the
same female, with the winner being chosen according
to his fitness, tights being resolved by random selection.
This mating pattern can be associated with polygy-
nandry (or promiscuity), as there is no monitoring of
how many sexual partners an agent can have in his or
her lifetime. In a homogeneous male population, it is
equivalent to fully random mate choice.
2.3.2. Polygyny
In the polygyny mode, a female who becomes mature
chooses one of the mature males to be her husband, who
will then father all of her children for as long as he lives.
Females pick the male i who can offer them the largest
‘adjusted fitness’ Fi, defined as
Fi :=
fi
wi + 1
, (2)
where fi is the male’s fitness and wi counts how many
wives he already has. If several males have the maxi-
mum adjusted fitness, females randomly choose one of
them. This follows the concept of polygyny threshold
(Verner and Willson, 1966; Orians, 1969) whereby a fe-
male might gain from marrying a male who already has
one or several wives if the amount of resources he has
to offer offsets the disadvantage of having to share with
other wives, in comparison to choosing a single male
with less resources.
This mode comes together with two variants. First,
if one of a male’s wives dies, she remains counted or
not in Fi. Still counting a deceased wife in Fi can be
interpreted as taking into account that she most likely
left her husband with at least one child to take care of,
decreasing the amount of resources (encapsulated in fi)
he can offer to a new wife. This option will be abbre-
viated DWC (Deceased Wives Count) versus DWnoC
(Deceased Wives Don’t Count).
Second, we can allow fertile females to remarry or
not when their husband dies, in which case female
choices are performed on the same basis as above. We
will denote this option by WREM (Widows Remarry) or
WnoREM (Widows Don’t Remarry). Menopausal fe-
males whose husband dies never remarry, whatever the
variant. WnoREM can be interpreted as integrating ei-
ther a lack of male interest in widows that most likely
already have children from their first husband, or a lack
of female interest in remarrying.
In contrast to the polygynandry mode, polygyny in-
tegrates explicit pair bonds, whereby one male can be
paired simultaneously to several females and females
are always paired to one single male at a time. Actually,
one of the polygyny variants turns out to be very close
to lifelong monogamy, as shown in section 3.2. An-
thropological studies indicate that the prevalent mating
systems in humans are polygyny and monogamy (Mar-
lowe, 2000), which account for approximatively 82%
and 17% of human societies, respectively. In addition,
pair bonding and its counterpart, cooperative breeding,
are essential features of humans (Burkart et al., 2009).
Therefore, our polygyny mode simulating pair bonds
seems more realistic than polygynandry. However, by
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its simplicity, the polygynandry mode remains a useful
testing tool.
2.3.3. Sex-biased migration
We tested a two-deme island model with sex-specific
migration rates mF for females and mM for males. An
agent can migrate only once in its lifetime, just before it
reaches sexual maturity. The probability that it migrates
at this time is given by its gender’s migration rate.
3. Results
With the parameters discussed in section 2, the to-
tal number of agents born during a typical simulation is
about 44’000. If a generation is set as the generation
of the father plus 1 for a boy and as the generation of
the mother plus 1 for a girl (the initial agents belong-
ing to generation 0), 2 million time steps give about 200
generations with approximately 100 agents of each sex
belonging to each generation. We measured inbreeding
defined as the proportion of matings taking place be-
tween siblings or parent-child. In all modes, it is found
below 6%.
3.1. Polygynandry
Among one thousand simulations of a polygynan-
drous mating system in a homogeneous male population
(pα = 1) and equal carrying capacities (so that death
rates are equal for males and females), we find 58% of
them with a TMRCA ratio rF/M = TF/TM between 0.5
and 1.5, compared with 20% between 1.5 and 2.5 (Fig-
ure 2 and Table 2). The distribution of the TMRCA ratio
shows a mean of 1.2 and a median of 1, with a standard
deviation of 0.8 reflecting the high stochasticity of the
process.
We use the number of children born to an agent in
her lifetime as a measure of her reproductive success.
We consider only agents that reached maturity, as agents
that died while still immature could not have any chil-
dren. As the population is kept constant, the average
number of children per agent of either sex is 2, but the
average number of children per mature agent is approx-
imately 4 (see Table 3). In the polygynandry mode with
homogeneous male population (corresponding to ran-
dom mating), males have a larger variance in reproduc-
tive success than females1. Indeed, as shown in Table
1We use the term ‘variance’ because of its common use in the con-
text of measuring reproductive success. However, it should be kept in
mind that the variance of a random variable is the square of its stan-
dard deviation, and it is the standard deviation that should be used as
the measure of variability that can be compared meaningfully with the
typical (or average) value of the random variable.
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Figure 3: Histogram of the number of children per mature female (left
panel) and per mature male (right panel) in the polygynandry case
with a homogeneous male population, for one specific simulation. As
the population is kept constant, the average number of children per
female and per male is 2, but here only the mature agents’ numbers
of children are shown, which is why the averages are around 4. The
maximum number of children a female can have between maturity
and menopause is 9, and all females who reach menopause have 9
children. 5% of mature females are childless because they die within
G time steps after reaching maturity. In comparison, 18% of the ma-
ture males die before they can have any children. Parameters are given
in Expression 1.
3, the standard deviation in reproductive success is on
average 4.2 for mature males, compared with 3 for ma-
ture females (the corresponding variances for males and
for females are respectively 17.7 and 8.8). This gen-
der difference takes place despite random mating be-
cause female reproductive rate is severely limited in
time by biological constraints (namely pregnancy and
lactation), while male reproductive rate is only limited
by the number of mates a male can access in his life-
time. In other words, female have a longer mating time
than males, as in Sutherland’s review of Bateman’s data
(Sutherland, 1985; Bateman, 1948). Yet, as mature fe-
males are most of the time unavailable (pregnant, lac-
tating or menopausal), even the most successful male of
each simulation cannot have, on average, more than 26
children. Figure 3 shows the number of children born to
mature females and males for one specific simulation.
Polygynandry in a heterogeneous male population
gives a very different distribution of TMRCA ratios. Re-
call that male population heterogeneity is characterized
by the two parameters pα and fβ. Figure 2 shows a su-
perposition of the distribution of the TMRCA ratio in
the homogeneous case and in the heterogeneous case
with pα = 0.12 and fβ = 0.12. Figures 4 and 5 show
that, for these values, it is possible to obtain more than
72% of the simulations with a TMRCA ratio higher than
1.5 and up to 30% of the simulations with a TMRCA ra-
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Figure 2: Histogram of the TMRCA ratio rF/M = TF/TM for a polygynandrous mating system with a homogeneous male population (hatched area)
and with a heterogeneous male population when pα = 0.12, fβ = 0.12 (plain area). The average of each distribution is indicated by dotted lines.
Each histogram is obtained over 1000 simulations. Parameters are given in Expression 1.
tio between 1.5 and 2.5, if pα / 0.5 and fβ / 0.3.
In Table 3, we report some characteristics of the male
and female reproductive successes when pα = 0.12 and
fβ = 0.12. In comparison to a homogeneous male
population, the variance in reproductive success among
mature males explodes: the standard deviation is now
equal to 8 and the most successful males have on av-
erage 82 children, while the situation has not changed
for females. Table 2 gives some characteristics of the
distribution of the TMRCA ratio when pα = 0.12 and
fβ = 0.12. The average TMRCA ratio is now 2.8 (me-
dian 2.2) and only 26% of the simulations show a TM-
RCA ratio between 0.5 and 1.5, compared with 29%
between 1.5 and 2.5.
3.2. Polygyny
Polygyny can be implemented in a homogeneous or
heterogeneous male population and with four possible
variants. With a homogeneous male population, the fol-
lowing behaviors are observed.
If deceased wives decrease a male’s adjusted fitness
and widows remarry (DWC/WREM), this variant is
equivalent to sequential polyandry together with mild
polygyny. Indeed, because of random female choices
and slightly fluctuating population sizes of mature fe-
males and males, some males have several wives at
the same time and females have several husbands in
their lifetime (but always one at a time). However,
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Figure 4: Phase diagram in the case of polygynandry with heteroge-
neous male population, giving the fraction of simulations with a TM-
RCA ratio rF/M = TF/TM larger than 1.5 in the two-parameter space
(fraction of alpha males pα; fertility of beta males fβ). Each grid point
is obtained over 200 simulations. Parameters are given in Expression
1.
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Figure 5: Phase diagram in the case of polygynandry with heteroge-
neous male population, giving the fraction of simulations with a TM-
RCA ratio rF/M = TF/TM between 1.5 and 2.5 in a region of the two-
parameter space (fraction of alpha males pα; fertility of beta males
fβ). Each grid point is obtained over 500 simulations. Parameters are
given in Expression 1.
at some point a male might not be chosen as a hus-
band anymore because he has too many deceased wives,
while a fertile female will never be without a husband.
This variant gives the highest average TMRCA ratio
r¯F/M = 1.5, a median of 1.2, 52% of the simulations
with 0.5 < rF/M < 1.5 and 24% of the simulations with
1.5 < rF/M < 2.5 (Table 2). Figure 6 shows the dis-
tributions of the number of spouses per agent over the
agents’ lifetime.
If females are not allowed to remarry
(DWC/WnoREM), polygyny is very weak because
males are little solicited, there is no polyandry what-
soever and this variant becomes very close to lifelong
monogamy (Figure 7).
If deceased wives do not influence the
males’ adjusted fitnesses and if widows remarry
(DWnoC/WREM), males can have more wives than in
the first variant, so we can expect sequential polyandry
and medium polygyny.
These two last variants have in common that they
both make genders as equivalent as they can get in
the polygyny mode, DWC/WnoREM being close to
monogamy, and DWnoC/WREM allowing everyone to
remarry without being penalized by past marriages.
This is why the average TMRCA ratio is close to 1 for
both variants (Table 2).
Finally, in the DWnoC/WnoREM variant, females
have only one opportunity to marry, while males not
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Figure 6: Histogram of the number of spouses per agent in the polyg-
yny mode with homogeneous male population, variant DWC/WREM
(deceased wives decrease a male’s adjusted fitness; with widows re-
marriage). Left panel: number of wives per mature male, right panel:
number of husbands per mature female. In comparison to the situa-
tion where widows cannot remarry (DWC/WnoREM), males get more
wives because there are more females looking for a husband (namely
the newly mature females plus the widows). Parameters are given in
Expression 1.
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Figure 7: Histogram of the number of spouses per agent in
the polygyny mode with homogeneous male population, variant
DWC/WnoREM (deceased wives decrease a male’s adjusted fitness;
no widows remarriage). Left panel: number of wives per mature male,
right panel: number of husbands per mature female. Males do not get
many wives because females do not seek remarriage if their husband
dies. The only females looking for a husband are the newly mature
ones, and since there are about as many mature females as males, this
mode is very close to lifelong monogamy. Parameters are given in
Expression 1.
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only can have several wives but are not penalized by
their late wives to attract new ones. With this variant,
a male can find it easier to become a common ances-
tor than a female, which is reflected by the fact that the
average TMRCA ratio rF/M is smaller than 1 (Table 2).
In summary, polygyny in a homogeneous male pop-
ulation, whatever the variant, gives an average TMRCA
ratio smaller than those obtained with heterogeneous
male populations in polygynandrous societies (see Ta-
ble 2). Similarly to polygynandry in a homogeneous
male population, the distributions of the number of chil-
dren per mature female and male suggest that the vari-
ance in reproductive success of males, although higher
than that of females (Table 3), is too much limited by fe-
males’ unavailability to allow the TMRCA ratio to take
off.
To investigate the impact of a heterogeneous male
population, we choose the variant DWC/WREM as it
gives the highest average TMRCA ratio with a homo-
geneous population. This variant with heterogeneous
male population is strongly polygynous, as alpha males
attract many more wives than beta males. The TMRCA
ratio is now between 1.5 and 2.5 in up to 30% of the sim-
ulations, as long as pα / 0.5 and fβ / 0.5 (Figure 8).
Tables 2 and 3 show characteristics of the distribution
of the TMRCA ratio and the numbers of children per
mature female and male for pα = 0.4, fβ = 0.2. The av-
erage TMRCA ratio is 2.9 and the median is 2.3. As in
the polygynandry mode with heterogeneous male pop-
ulation, 26% of the simulations have a TMRCA ratio
between 0.5 and 1.5, compared with 29% between 1.5
and 2.5. Figure 9 shows the distributions of the num-
ber of spouses per female and male for pα = 0.4 and
fβ = 0.2.
3.3. Sex-biased migration
We tested sex-biased migration in a two-deme island
model of polygynandrous societies with homogeneous
male populations. As shown in Figure 10 which repre-
sent the results for one of the two demes chosen arbitrar-
ily, about 30% of the simulations have a TMRCA ratio
between 1.5 and 2.5 if mF > 0.1 and mM = 0, where mF
and mM are respectively the female and male migration
rates. Table 2 presents the main properties of the dis-
tribution of the TMRCA ratio for one of the two demes
when males never migrate and 10% of the females do.
The average TMRCA ratio is 2.1 with a median of 1.7.
However, there are still more simulations with ratios be-
tween 0.5 and 1.5 than between 1.5 and 2.5 (37% vs.
32%).
A non-zero female migration rate together with a zero
male migration rate means that ‘as soon as’ (backward
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Figure 8: Phase diagram in the case of polygyny with heterogeneous
male population, deceased wives decreasing a male’s adjusted fitness
and widows remarriage (DWC/WREM), giving the fraction of simu-
lations with a TMRCA ratio rF/M = TF/TM between 1.5 and 2.5 in
the two-parameter space (fraction of alpha males pα; fertility of beta
males fβ). Each grid point is obtained over 1000 simulations. Param-
eters are given in Expression 1.
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Figure 9: Histogram of the number of spouses per agent in the polyg-
yny mode with heterogeneous male population (pα = 0.4, fβ = 0.2),
variant DWC/WREM (deceased wives decrease a male’s adjusted fit-
ness; with widows remarriage). Left panel: number of wives per ma-
ture male, right panel: number of husbands per mature female. Com-
pared with the same variant in a homogeneous male population, the
situation for females has not changed, while alpha males can now have
up to 9 wives. There are many unmarried males because for each male
who has n wives, there are n − 1 males with no wife (if there are as
many mature males as females). The bimodal distribution of the num-
ber of wives per male reveals the two populations of alpha and beta
males. Parameters are given in Expression 1.
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Figure 10: Phase diagram in the case of polygynandry with homoge-
neous male population and migration, giving the fraction of simula-
tions for one deme with a TMRCA ratio rF/M = TF/TM between 1.5
and 2.5 in the two-parameter space (female migration rate mF ; male
migration rate mM). Each grid point is obtained over 200 simulations.
Parameters are given in Expression 1.
in time) one branch of the backward all-females ances-
try lines exits deme A to enter deme B, we can find a
female common ancestor for deme A only if either this
branch comes back into A, or all-females ancestry lines
from A all enter B and coalesce there. This is why fe-
male dispersal in the absence of male dispersal requires
more time (backwards) to find a female common ances-
tor.
In the blue region of Figure 10 where mF = 0 and
mM > 0, the TMRCA ratio is not really zero but in fact
does not exist because no MRCA female could ever be
found for our sample (the last generation of males). In-
deed, if any male from the sample of one of the demes
(say A) was born in the other deme (B) and migrated
later to A, his mother necessarily belonged to deme B.
Since the female migration rate is zero, this female’s
all-females ancestry line is entirely in B and will never
coalesce with the all-females ancestry lines of the other
males from the sample in A, which are entirely in A.
3.4. Sex-specific death rates and sex-biased bottleneck
There is another way than sex-biased migration to
shift the distribution of the TMRCA ratio rF/M =
TF/TM to higher values in a homogeneous male popula-
tion (with any mating system), which is to set a smaller
male than female carrying capacity, so that there is a
higher male than female death rate (the sex of newborns
being randomly chosen with equal probability). Figure
11 shows that about 30% of the simulations have a TM-
RCA ratio between 1.5 and 2.5 when KF ≈ 1.5 · KM .
For example, with KF = 120 and KM = 75, we get 23%
of the simulations with 0.5 < rF/M < 1.5, 30% with
1.5 < rF/M < 2.5 and 45% of the simulations above 2.5
(see Tables 2 and 3).
Death causes reported in studies of hunter-gatherer
societies are usually categorized into four classes: dis-
eases (illness or parasites), degenerative or congenital
diseases (including childbirth and old age), accidents
and violence (Hill et al., 2007; Hill and Hurtado, 1996).
The main sex difference observed in a mortality study
among the Hiwi hunter-gatherers of Venezuela (Hill
et al., 2007) is manifest for people older than 40 years
old and is mainly due to violence (19 deaths per 1000
years at risk for males vs. 3 for females). In another
large study among the Ache people of Paraguay (Hill
and Hurtado, 1996), accidents and external warfare ac-
count together for 37% of male deaths vs. 18% of fe-
male deaths.
However, if a higher male than female death rate is
mainly due to violence, it cannot be the ultimate ex-
planation for a TMRCA ratio higher than 1, as higher
levels of lethal violence among males pinpoints sex-
specific behaviors that require a more profound expla-
nation. This is discussed further in Section 4.
As suggested in Hammer et al. (2008), another mech-
anism that could be responsible for the two-to-one
female-male TMRCA ratio in humans is a sex-biased
bottleneck at some time in the past, during which more
males than females died. It is possible to get a TM-
RCA ratio higher than 1 by introducing a sex-biased
bottleneck in our ABM as follows: we start a simula-
tion with the usual carrying capacities KF = KM = 75
and impose for instance KM = 2 during 300 time steps
(> G) near the end of the simulation (e.g. at time step
1.7 × 106 within a simulation of total duration 2 × 106
time steps), and then restore KF = KM = 75 for the re-
maining time steps (results not shown). An interesting
constraint is that the duration of the bottleneck has to
be longer than the pregnancy length. Otherwise, many
unrelated males are born shortly after the bottleneck
from females who were pregnant before the bottleneck
started, which considerably lowers its effect on paternal
ancestry lines. Therefore a sex-biased bottleneck would
necessitate that males and females facing the same hos-
tile environmental conditions have very different sur-
vival rates in a consistent way over several months or
years. Warfare with indigenous tribes, being attacked
by or hunting unknown animals, toxic food ingestions
or simply accidents during a long-distance migration
through new territories could be explanations for a one-
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Figure 11: Phase diagram in the case of polygynandry with homogeneous male population and sex-specific carrying capacities, giving the fraction
of simulations with a TMRCA ratio rF/M = TF/TM larger than 1.5 (left panel) and between 1.5 and 2.5 (right panel) in the two-parameter space
(carrying capacity for males KM ; carrying capacity for females KF ). Each grid point is obtained over 500 simulations. Parameters are given in
Expression 1, except for KM and KF that are varied as indicated in the phase diagrams.
off (or repeated) sex-biased bottleneck, but again, such
sex-biased exposures to death causes would require a
deepest explanation, as discussed in Section 4.
3.5. Other mechanisms
We tested the effect of sex-specific maturity ages,
namely females reaching sexual maturity before males,
so as to reflect findings of anthropological studies show-
ing that the age at first reproduction (AFR) tends to be
younger for females than for males (Helgason et al.,
2003; Tremblay and Vezina, 2000). As explained in
Tang et al. (2002), increasing the male generation length
in a genetic model would decrease the per-year NRY
mutation rate, so that genetic distance would be larger
for mtDNA than for NRY and coalescent models would
infer a larger female than male TMRCA (counted in
years). However, in our non-genetic model, increasing
the male AFR actually reduces slightly the number of
children a male can have in his lifetime and the male
variance in reproductive success is reduced as well. The
average TMRCA ratio remains close to 1 under this con-
dition in all mating systems with a homogeneous male
population (results not shown).
We also tested the effect of letting menopausal fe-
males continue to participate in the mating interactions,
thus mating without ever getting pregnant anymore. In
the polygynandry mode, this uniformly affects all males
in making them susceptible to ‘losing their turn’ by
picking menopausal females. It thus slightly reduces
the male variance in reproductive success, so the aver-
age TMRCA ratio remains close to 1. In the polygyny
mode, having a menopausal wife decreases a male’s ad-
justed fitness Fi without bringing him the benefit of hav-
ing additional children from her. Again, this affects all
males uniformly and does not make the average TM-
RCA ratio rise above 1 (results not shown).
3.6. Female and male ancestors
Baumeister’s interpretation of the observed TMRCA
ratio is that ‘today’s human population is descended
from twice as many women as men’ (Baumeister,
2010). The claims associated with this interpretation
need clarification. First, Baumeister makes use of two
concepts as if they were equivalent, which is not the
case: (i) breeding individuals (‘throughout the entire
history of the human race, maybe 80% of women but
only 40% of men reproduced’) and (ii) ancestors as de-
termined from the presently living individuals (‘Today’s
human population is descended from twice as many
women as men’, ‘Most men who ever lived did not have
descendants who are alive today. Their lines were dead
ends.’). As the TMRCA ratio reflects characteristics of
ancestry lines, we retain the concept relating to the num-
ber of ancestors.
Second, it is unclear whether Baumeister counts our
ancestors along all possible ancestry lines or only along
all-female and all-male lines. In the latter case, let
us call the corresponding ancestors ‘mtDNA-ancestors’
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and ‘NRY-ancestors’. Consider a man from a past gen-
eration who had no sons, but had a daughter whose de-
scendant line reaches someone from the present pop-
ulation (us). Then this man is not one of our NRY-
ancestors, but he is an ancestor in the genealogical
sense, and he potentially transmitted some of his DNA
to us, although not including his NRY. In other words,
the reproductive success of such a man is not to be over-
looked. Because mtDNA and NRY are just two of a
vast number of loci on the human genome, this exam-
ple illustrates the fact that the numbers of our mtDNA-
and NRY-ancestors have little significance, if any, in
terms of reproductive success and genetic transmission.
Thus, if Baumeister meant that we have twice as many
mtDNA- as NRY-ancestors, no evolutionary behavioral
conclusion can actually be drawn for that assumption.
On the other hand, the TMRCA ratio informs us
about all-female and all-male ancestry lines, and says
nothing about our ancestors along all possible ancestry
lines. Thus, if Baumeister meant that we have twice as
many female as male ancestors in the general sense, this
quantitative claim cannot be justified on the basis of the
observed TMRCA ratio. It is our purpose to test this
guess in the present section.
To that aim, we count the number of agents whose
descendant line along any genealogical path reaches
at least one agent of the present generation. We call
these agents ‘ancestors’ and categorize them according
to their gender. Let us stress that the lines of descent can
follow any path (e.g. female-male-male-female-etc.),
not only matrilines and patrilines, and the gender of an
ancestor’s descendant(s) belonging to the present gen-
eration does not play any role. This means that from
the viewpoint of the present generation, non-ancestors
are genealogical dead ends, or extinct individuals. The
numbers of female and male ancestors give a fair mea-
sure of the transmission success of each gender, in a
genealogical and potentially genetic sense. The results
are shown in Table 1.
The ratio of the number of female ancestors over the
number of male ancestors, rA in Table 1, is approxi-
mately 1.4 in the modes that maximize the probability
that the TMRCA ratio lies between 1.5 and 2.5. The
standard deviations of all values shown in Table 1 are
very small, so only that of rA is shown. This ratio
rA ' 1.4 translates into ≈ 20% of the males becoming
ancestors (≈ 42% of the mature males), compared with
≈27% of the females (≈ 59% of the mature females).
In other words, ≈20% of all males born during a simu-
lation have a descent line that reaches the present gen-
eration, as compared with ≈27% of all females. These
values also hold within each generation, on average. For
instance, approximately ≈20% of the males within each
generation (except for the generations that are closest to
the present generation) became ancestors of the present
generation in the sense given above.
In summary, Baumeister’s guess of a female-male
ancestors ratio of 2 is of the right order, albeit proba-
bly overestimated by 30% according to our simulations.
Yet, this does not prove that the observed TMRCA ratio
rF/M = TF/TM ' 2 could not be found for quite differ-
ent female-male ancestors ratios under different simula-
tion conditions. Because, as already stressed, there is no
logical link between the female-male ancestors ratio and
the TMRCA ratio, the factor of two for the later does
not translate into a prediction for the former. We can
state that, under the conditions in our ABM that make
the TMRCA ratio most likely to be between 1.5 and 2.5,
the present generation has 1.4 times as many female as
male ancestors. This supports qualitatively the thesis
defended by Baumeister (2010).
4. Summary of results
The ABM that we have introduced and studied is for-
mulated in a way that allows us to determine exactly
the female and male TMRCAs under many different
conditions: two fundamentally different mating systems
(polygynandry and polygyny) with several variants each
and in the presence (or absence) of sex-biased migra-
tion. In our ABM, each male has a fitness f ∈ [0, 1].
Depending on the mating mode, this fitness acts as the
probability of mating or getting a wife. While alpha
males have a fitness fα = 1, beta males have a fitness
fβ with 0 < fβ < 1 (all beta males have the same fit-
ness). If all males have the same fitness (all-alphas or
all-betas), the male population is homogeneous. A male
population consisting of both alpha and beta males is
heterogeneous.
We find that the mating system as such has little in-
fluence on the TMRCA ratio rF/M = TF/TM . The most
important finding of our study is that homogenous and
heterogeneous male populations lead to two very differ-
ent regimes, the latter being more likely than the for-
mer to be responsible for the observed TMRCA ratio of
about 2 found by genetic studies (mtDNA-based TM-
RCA: Tang et al. (2002); Ingman et al. (2000); Cann
et al. (1987), NRY-based TMRCA: Tang et al. (2002);
Pritchard et al. (1999); Thomson et al. (2000); Hammer
and Zegura (2002)). Indeed, the only condition clearly
able to account for a TMRCA ratio of 2 is a heteroge-
neous male population, whereby some males are alphas
and others are betas. This implies an important level
of competition among males in order to be recognized
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Condition r0 rA σ(rA) rFA r
M
A r
F,mat
A r
M,mat
A
Polygynandry
HMP 1.0 1.13 0.01 30% 26% 64% 57%
Polygyny
HMP, WREM, DWC 1.0 1.05 0.01 31% 30% 67% 64%
Polygynandry
pα = 0.12, fβ = 0.12 1.0 1.38 0.02 27% 20% 59% 43%
Polygyny
WREM, DWC
pα = 0.4, fβ = 0.2 1.0 1.42 0.01 27% 19% 58% 41%
Table 1: Characteristics of the numbers of female and male ancestors of the present generations in four modes. Each row gives the results for one
specific simulation. r0 is the ratio of the number of females over the number of males who were born during the simulation. It is shown as a control
and should always be very close to 1. rA is the ratio of the number of female ancestors over the number of male ancestors; σ(rA) is the standard
deviation of this ratio. rFA is the ratio of the number of female ancestors over the number of females born during the simulation. In other words,
it is the fraction of females who became ancestors. rMA is the fraction of males who became ancestors. r
F,mat
A and r
M,mat
A are, resp., the fractions
of mature females and mature males who became ancestors. HMP stands for Homogeneous Male Population. The following abbreviations are
explained in Section 2.3.2: WREM = Widows Remarry, DWC = Deceased Wives Count. pα is the proportion of alpha males; fβ is the fitness of
beta males. Parameters are given in Expression 1. Averages are obtained over 500 simulations with approximately 44’000 agents each.
as an alpha or appear like one. In order to reproduce the
empirical value rF/M ' 2, our simulations show that less
than half of the males can be alphas. In addition, betas
can have at most half the fitness of alphas.
Another finding of the present study concerns the hy-
pothesis made by Baumeister (2010), namely that the
observed TMRCA ratio rF/M ' 2 means that we have
twice as many female as male ancestors. We define an
‘ancestor’ as an individual whose descendant line along
any genealogical path reaches at least one agent from
the present generation. We find that in the modes max-
imizing the probability of the TMRCA ratio to be be-
tween 1.5 and 2.5, the present generation has approx-
imately 1.4 times as many female as male ancestors.
Therefore, our results support Baumeister’s interpreta-
tion to a certain degree, and at the same time the impor-
tant behavioral consequences he develops in (Baumeis-
ter, 2010) regarding higher male than female competi-
tiveness and risk taking.
Because of the life cycle parameters input into our
ABM concerning pregnancy and lactation times, males
always have a higher variance in reproductive success
than females. In the polygynandry mode with homo-
geneous male population for instance, the standard de-
viation of the number of children per mature female is
3, compared with 4.2 for males (for an average number
of children per mature agent of either sex of 4.3). In
addition, the forward-looking process of genealogical
tree building exhibits a large stochasticity (see σ(rF/M)
in Table 2). These two facts contribute in creating
a stretched rF/M distribution with values that can rise
above 1 even with a homogeneous male population.
For example, in a polygyny variant (DWC/WREM)
with homogeneous male population, we obtain an aver-
age r¯F/M = 1.5, a median of 1.2, 9% of the simulations
with rF/M < 0.5, 52% with 0.5 < rF/M > 1.5, 24%
with 1.5 < rF/M < 2.5 and the remaining 15% with
rF/M > 2.5 (over a total of 1000 simulations). However,
the contrast with a heterogeneous male population is
striking. In the same polygyny variant with 40% alphas
males and betas’ fitness five times smaller than alphas’,
we obtain r¯F/M = 2.9, a median of 2.3, 1% of the sim-
ulations with rF/M < 0.5, 26% with 0.5 < rF/M < 1.5,
29% with 1.5 < rF/M < 2.5 and 43% with rF/M > 2.5
(over 1000 simulations).
Hence, the probability of finding a TMRCA ratio be-
tween 0.5 and 1.5 is reduced about twofold with a het-
erogeneous male population as compared to a homoge-
neous population. Because of the high stochasticity of
the process and the relatively small population size (150
individuals in our ABM), increasing the average TM-
RCA ratio goes together with flattening the TMRCA
13
ratio distribution. This leads to at most 30% of the sim-
ulations with 1.5 < rF/M < 2.5 under the conditions
tested in our model.
Sex-biased migration in our two-deme island model
is able to enhance the TMRCA ratio significantly, but
only under the quite unrealistic condition of strictly zero
male dispersal. In reality, modern foragers show a fluid
multilocal pattern of residence, whereby couples alter-
nate living with the wife’s and the husband’s kin (Mar-
lowe, 2004). From an ethnological point of view, the
male and female migration rates are thus expected to be
similar among modern humans before the transition to
agriculture (Wilkins and Marlowe, 2006), and not com-
ply with the condition found in our migration model.
However, it should be noted that this migration model
is very simplified, as agents can move only once in a
lifetime and only between two island-like demes with-
out any concept of isolation by distance or population
split. Yet a genetic study showed that global NRY and
mtDNA patterns are not shaped by female sex-biased
dispersal (Wilder et al., 2004a), although human mi-
gration in general plays a complex and important role
in shaping patterns of genetic variation (Hammer et al.,
2008; Cox and Hammer, 2010).
Another mechanism that can yield an average TM-
RCA ratio above 1 is a higher male than female death
rate either over the whole simulation duration or over
a given number of time steps, corresponding to a sex-
biased bottleneck. However, unequal death rates sus-
tained over the time necessary to induce unequal TMR-
CAs would unlikely be caused by chance alone. They
would need to rest on an existing gender discrepancy
in the susceptibility to the main cause of death. Al-
though modern medical studies show that males are
more susceptible than females to diseases (Hon and Nel-
son, 2006), we are unaware of any disease occurring in
hunter-gatherer societies that would affect males more
than females at the level necessary to induce a sex-
biased TMRCA ratio (according to our results, such a
disease would have to keep alive at least 1.5 times more
females than males). On the other hand, any form of
violence or accidents seems a more likely sex-specific
death cause as it correlates with anthropological find-
ings (Hill et al., 2007; Hill and Hurtado, 1996). High
levels of violence and accidents among males would
mean that there is an underlying male-male competi-
tive drive to become skilled and/or to be less exposed to
hazards, or to be perceived as either strong or socially
integrated, and so on.
Putting all results together, the underlying explana-
tion that appears to be favored by our results is that un-
equal biological costs of reproduction is the root cause
of unequal TMRCAs, this cost asymmetry cascading
into female choosy selection (Baumeister, 2010; Ogas
and Gaddam, 2011). Female choice causes male-male
competition and male’s honest signaling, which takes
the form of risk-taking behavior (Zahavi, 1975; Dia-
mond, 2002). This further cascades into higher male
than female death rates through risky signaling and re-
sults in a smaller male than female breeding population,
both because females select a subset of males for repro-
duction and because of male’s higher death rate. Mild
polygyny appears as a by-product of this chain mecha-
nism, favored by female selection and male deaths.
Tables 2 and 3 compile the characteristics of the dis-
tribution of the TMRCA ratio and of the distribution of
reproductive success under all conditions.
5. Discussion
The empirical data to which we compare our model
simulations refers to a unique human evolutionary his-
tory, which corresponds to a single realization of a com-
plex stochastic process. The comparison between our
simulations and empirical data is thus not straightfor-
ward. However, our numerical construction of the dis-
tribution of the TMRCA ratio rF/M = TF/TM allows us
to estimate the likelihood of each model using the stan-
dard statistical prescription of estimating the likelihood
of the data given the model. In other words, the frac-
tion of simulations for different ranges of TMRCA ra-
tios reported in the above figures and tables provide the
corresponding likelihood of the model with respect to
the empirical evidence (i.e. the observed TMRCA ratio
rF/M ' 2).
Overall, our results support the hypothesis that we are
descended from males who were highly successful in
terms of reproductive output in a highly male-male com-
petitive context, while females were exposed to a much
lower level of female-female competition. This is not
to say that there is no female-female competition, but it
does usually not take the same form and does not lead to
such severe life-threatening consequences as male-male
competition (Campbell, 2002). Indeed, male choice (re-
sulting in female-female competition) can be expected
in humans because of high paternal investment (Geary,
2000) and is evidenced by some female physical charac-
teristics (Jasienska et al., 2004). Actually, the introduc-
tion of male choice in our ABM would reduce the fe-
male breeding population and thus the female TMRCA.
Therefore, taking male choice into account in our ABM
would have required even higher levels of male popu-
lation heterogeneity in order to reproduce the observed
two-to-one female-male TMRCA ratio.
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Condition r¯F/M σ(rF/M) µ1/2(rF/M) 0.5 < rF/M < 1.5 1.5 < rF/M < 2.5
Polygynandry
HMP 1.2 0.8 1.0 58% 20%
Polygyny
HMP, WnoREM, DWnoC 0.8 0.6 0.6 54% 7%
Polygyny
HMP, WnoREM, DWC 1.1 0.9 0.9 59% 16%
Polygyny
HMP, WREM, DWnoC 1.2 0.9 0.9 55% 17%
Polygyny
HMP, WREM, DWC 1.5 1.1 1.2 52% 24%
Polygynandry
pα = 0.12, fβ = 0.12 2.8 2 2.2 26% 29%
Polygyny
WREM, DWC
pα = 0.4, fβ = 0.2 2.9 2.2 2.3 26% 29%
Sex-biased migration
Polygynandry, HMP
mF = 0.1, mM = 0 2.1 1.4 1.7 37% 32%
Unequal death rates
Polygynandry, HMP
KF = 120, KM = 75 2.9 2.1 2.3 23% 30%
Table 2: Characteristics of the distribution of the TMRCA ratio rF/M = TF/TM for all modes. σ and µ1/2 denote respectively the standard deviation
and the median. Averages are denoted by bars over the variables. a < rF/M < b gives the proportion of the simulations with a TMRCA ratio
comprised between a and b. HMP stands for Homogeneous Male Population. The following abbreviations are explained in Section 2.3.2: WREM
= Widows Remarry, WnoREM = Widows don’t Remarry, DWC = Deceased Wives Count, DWnoC = Deceased Wives don’t Count. pα is the
proportion of alpha males; fβ is the fitness of beta males; mF and mM are the female and male migration rates; KF and KM are the female and male
carrying capacities. Parameters are given in Expression 1, except for KF , KM and the number of iterations (3 million) in the unequal death rates
mode, and the number of iterations (2.5 million) in the migration mode. Averages are obtained over 1000 simulations.
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Condition k¯F k¯M σ(kF) σ(kM) max(kF) max(kM) wF wM
1. Polygynandry
HMP 4.3 4.3 3 4.2 9 26 5% 17%
Polygyny
HMP, WnoREM, DWnoC 3.4 3.4 2.6 3.4 9 16 2% 29%
Polygyny
HMP, WnoREM, DWC 3.5 3.5 2.5 3 9 19 2% 10%
Polygyny
HMP, WREM, DWnoC 4.3 4.3 2.9 3.9 9 22 3% 11%
Polygyny
HMP, WREM, DWC 4.3 4.3 2.9 3.6 9 24 3% 7%
Polygynandry
pα = 0.12, fβ = 0.12 4.3 4.3 3 8 9 82 4% 25%
Polygyny
WREM, DWC
pα = 0.4, fβ = 0.2 4.3 4.3 2.9 7.8 9 47 3% 58%
Sex-biased migration
Polygynandry, HMP
mF = 0.1, mM = 0 4.3 4.3 3 4.2 9 26 4% 17%
Unequal death rates
Polygynandry, HMP
KF = 120, KM = 75 4.3 7 3 7.2 9 51 4% 12%
Table 3: Characteristics of the distributions of male and female reproductive success for mature agents in all modes. The number of children per
mature female and male are denoted by kF and kM , resp. Averages are denoted by bars over the variables. σ denotes the standard deviation. wF and
wM are the proportions of childless mature females and males. HMP stands for Homogeneous Male Population. The following abbreviations are
explained in Section 2.3.2: WREM = Widows Remarry, WnoREM = Widows don’t Remarry, DWC = Deceased Wives Count, DWnoC = Deceased
Wives don’t Count. pα is the proportion of alpha males; fβ is the fitness of beta males; mF and mM are the female and male migration rates; KF
and KM are the female and male carrying capacities. Parameters are given in Expression 1, except for KF , KM and the number of iterations (3
million) in the unequal death rates mode, and the number of iterations (2.5 million) in the sex-biased migration mode. Averages are obtained over
1000 simulations with approximately 44’000 agents each, except for the unequal death rates and the sex-biased migration modes that simulate
approximately 106’000 and 55’000 agents per simulation, resp.
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We would like to stress that, by highlighting male-
male competition, we are not dismissing the essential
role of cooperation in the evolutionary history of hu-
mans. It seems to us that the two concepts are not
exclusive. For instance, cooperative hunting and shar-
ing offer an opportunity for reputation building, which
can be positively correlated with mating success (Gur-
ven and Hill, 2009). Communal male hunting can thus
integrate an element of competition for being the best
hunter. Furthermore, within-group cooperation might
be maintained or enhanced by between-groups com-
petition, although this is debated (Bowles (2006) ar-
gues in this sense but is contradicted by Langergraber
et al. (2011)). Finally, one of us implemented an ABM
of a public good game with altruistic punishment and
found that cooperation can thrive among selfish disad-
vantageous inequity averse agents (Hetzer and Sornette,
2009), a conclusion also supported by game theoreti-
cal calculations (Darcet and Sornette, 2008; Hetzer and
Sornette, 2001). This suggests that competitive agents
still find it advantageous to cooperate in order to achieve
their goals.
That males have inherited a higher propensity to com-
pete than females is reflected by recent psychological
and sociological studies. In a laboratory experiment
where participants were given the choice between a
competitive tournament and a non-competitive reward,
men chose to enter the competitive environment twice
as much as women, although there were no gender
differences in performance (Niederle and Vesterlund,
2007). Rather than sex-specific risk or feedback aver-
sion, this result was caused by men being more overcon-
fident than women and preferring competition. A mile-
stone study of household investments showed that men
are more overconfident than women (Barber and Odean,
2001). This resulted in men trading more and conse-
quently hurting their performance more than women. In
contrast, a recent chinese study found that women may
in fact be more competitive than men (and/or univer-
sities may sort genders differently by competitive atti-
tude) (Ong and Chen, 2011). This study used an all-pay
auction experiment where winning only depends upon
willingness to pay, in order to rule out ability and confi-
dence confounds of real tests used in prior studies.
One domain of modern activity where differences in
gender attitudes may be prominent is the financial area.
It is well documented that men trade more than women
and this consequently hurts their performance as they
underperform on average their female peers. The idea is
now emerging that the overwhelming majority of young
men on trading floors might play a role in letting fi-
nancial bubbles and crashes go out of control (Coates
et al., 2010). In the light of the results presented in the
present paper, we propose that a high male-male com-
petition for reproductive success that has been permeat-
ing the history of modern humans (200’000 years ago to
recent times) has contributed through gene-culture co-
evolution to create gender competitiveness-related dif-
ferences. These differences are not fully understood
yet and we believe that investigating their evolutionary
causes can help deal with the possible negative conse-
quences associated with a maladaptation to the modern
era. These considerations raise the question of how to
adjust our cultures and/or design society rules in order
to match better the evolutionary-based inherited human
traits described above and the requirements of the mod-
ern ages.
Our ABM could be further improved in future work
by adding genetics. In particular, agents could be en-
dowed with genetic sequences that are inherited, un-
dergo mutations, determine agent fitness and are thus
under selection pressure. A more realistic population
structure could also be implemented in order to investi-
gate further the effects of migration. Finally, after inte-
grating genetics, it would be highly interesting to see
whether existing softwares that infer TMRCAs using
DNA samples are able to find the TMRCAs realized
by our ABM with a reasonable accuracy under differ-
ent mating systems and life cycle characteristics, when
given only a sample of genetic sequences.
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